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  File sharing systems such as Napster and KaZaA are accused by the recording industry of 
causing declines in sales of music CDs, and recently users of these systems are under lawsuit attack.   
However, there is not sufficient evidence that file sharing systems are responsible for the recent 
decline in music CD sales. Two previous studies examined micro data of sales and downloads and 
found mixed results regarding the connection between file sharing and CD sales (Blackburn, 2004; 
Oberholzer and Strumpf, 2004). 
  The current essay estimated the effect of file sharing systems on music CD sales using micro 
data from Japan in 2004. Japan’s file sharing system (“Winny”) is almost completely decentralized 
and highly anonymous compared with ones addressed in the two previous studies, thus Japanese 
users can download music files with less concern about lawsuits. The goal of this research is to 
examine the effect of file sharing on music CD sales in such an illegal-copy-friendly file sharing 
system.   
  Based on micro data of CD sales and numbers of downloads, we found that there was very little 
evidence that file sharing reduces music CD sales in Japan. We controlled simultaneous bias between 
sales and downloads by instrumental variables, but did not find correlation between CD sales and 
numbers of downloads. Although there were large differences in the numbers of downloads among 
CD titles, these differences did not affect CD sales. We also carried out a user survey on file sharing 
and CD purchases with consideration to the potential bias of respondents trying to understate their 
illegal copying activity. This survey also showed that file sharing had very limited influence on CD 
purchases. 
 
JEL Classification: O34 Intellectual Property Rights, L82 Entertainment; Media 
Keyword: Copyright, File sharing, P-to-P, Intellectual Property Rights, Music, Entertainment 
Industry 
 
Main part of this research is funded by the Mobile Society Research Institute. 
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1. Framework of optimal protection level 
 
  The goal of intellectual property rights is to give creators incentive for development 
of information goods. Information goods such as technologies, music and movies can be 
copied without additional cost. Thus it is optimal to price such goods at zero after the 
goods are developed. However, nobody will provide information goods if they know 
that the price is zero. To give incentive for development, intellectual property rights 
such as the patent system and copyright were introduced. Therefore we should adjust 
the strength of intellectual property rights to balance two factors--benefit of use and 
benefit of incentive for development. 
  Let x be the strength of intellectual property rights. X can be protection periods, 
scope of patents, strong law enforcement against piracy, etc.    As x increases, revenue 
of creators increases and encourages the development of new information goods. We 
denote this benefit of new information goods as g(revenue(x)). Note that g is a function 
of intermediary variable revenue. On the other hand, larger x decreases users’ benefit 
because users become less free to copy information goods. Note that users include 
creators (or inventors) who want to use information goods (e.g. patents) to develop their 
own new information goods. We represent users’ benefit as f(x), which is a decreasing 
function of x. Total benefit is a sum of users’ benefit and benefit of incentive for new 
development, that is, f(x) + g(revenue(x)). 
  Figure 1 shows these functions. Users’ benefit f(x) is a decreasing function of x and 
benefit of incentive g(revenue(x) is an increasing function of x. When we assume that 
both curves are concave, the total benefit has an inverted-U form and there is a social 
optimum protection level x*. If we are under this level x* we should strengthen the 
protection level of property rights. But if we are beyond this level we should weaken 
protection. Perfect protection of intellectual property rights is not optimal. 
   
  Figure 1 
   
  This is well understood regarding the patent system because there are many studies 
that consider the function f(x) or g(revenue(x)) and argue against the too-strong patent 
system. For example, Merge and Nelson (1990), based on the history of innovation, 
insist that a wider scope of patents is harmful to next stage innovation. Heller and 
Eisenberg (1998) reported a “tragedy of anti-commons” in the biotechnology industry-- 
that is, too many patent holders prevent efficient use of technology. These two studies 
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indicate that stronger patent protection could lead to welfare loss, suggesting that f(x) 
has negative slope. On the other hand, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) reported that a 
patent is not primarily a tool to protect intellectual property; rather, lead time of 
development is more important. Lerner (2002) analyzed empirically whether stronger 
patent systems encouraged the number of patents, and obtained mixed results. These 
two studies are interpreted to examine whether or not g(revenue(x)) has positive slope. 
In summary, as far as the patent system is concerned, it is recognized that perfect 
protection is not optimal. 
  Regarding copyrights, however, people tend to insist on perfect protection. For 
example, it is illegal to put one page of a book on a personal website or to write lyric 
lines on a BBS, although these acts are unlikely to decrease creator revenue. The 
European Union tried to pass a tough anti-piracy law and the Recording Industry 
Association of America began suing individual P2P software users as piracy criminals. 
In Japan some recording companies introduced copy-controlled compact discs that 
cannot be copied to any digital media. On top of this, a programmer of file sharing 
software was arrested by Japanese police. There seems to be no consideration given to 
users’ benefit of copying and sharing information goods. 
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        But do these illegal copying activities reduce creator revenue?    In other words, 
does copying reduce the sales of original information goods?    If file sharing does not 
reduce sales of music CDs, we should say that file sharing improves economic welfare. 
Recently this is a hot topic in the music industry, especially focusing on peer to peer file 
sharing. For example, Oberholzer and Strumpf, (2004) estimated the effect of file 
sharing on music CD sales using individual music title data, and found no clear 
correlation between sales and downloads. Blackburn (2004) also estimated the effect of 
file sharing using micro data and reported that file sharing reduced the sales of big titles 
of famous artists but increased the sales of many other minor titles of ordinary artists.   
  This paper estimated the effect of file sharing systems on music CD sales using 
micro data from Japan in 2004. Japan’s file sharing system (“Winny”) is almost 
completely decentralized and highly anonymous compared with ones looked at in the 
two previous studies, thus Japanese users can download music files with less concern 
about lawsuits. The goal of this research is to examine the effect of file sharing on music 
CD sales in such an illegal copy-friendly file sharing system. Based on micro data of 
CD sales and numbers of downloads, we found that there was very little evidence that 
file sharing reduces music CD sales in Japan. We controlled simultaneous bias between 
sales and downloads by instrumental variables, but did not find correlation between CD 
sales and numbers of downloads.   
                                                   
1  Although a few scholars such as Lessig (2001) are against strong copyright protection, they are minorities in the 
business world.   
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2. File sharing and data collection 
 
  “Winny” is the most popular file sharing system in Japan. Winny is almost 
completely decentralized and does not have a central server. Since file names and 
locations are decoded, users do not know from where they are downloading. Winny also 
scatters intermediate files randomly in users’ hard drives, thus it is difficult to identify 
the initial user who first put any particular file on the Winny network. These 
characteristics account for why police in Japan consider Winny to be illegal. It is said 
that this is a reason why Japanese police arrested the programmer of Winny rather than 
users. 
  Figure 3 shows the Winny user interface. Users input the file name keyword, which 
is usually a CD title or an artist’s name. Then Winny searches the files in the Winny user 
network that include the keyword, and shows such files as candidates for download. 
Users choose the targeted file and download begins. Fortunately, Winny displays three 
useful pieces of file information: file size, referenced quantity, and hash. Hash is a 
unique file code that allows identification of the file without double counting. 
Referenced quantity is, approximately speaking, total downloaded quantity.
2      Thus 





  Data collection was done every weekend from June 2004 to November 2004. The 
collection procedure was as follows: 
(1) Obtained weekly, 30 best-selling music CD titles from Original Confidence   
(albums and singles separately)     
        (2) Four or five researchers searched titles in the Winny user network 
and obtained file data. This search was done usually on weekends.   
(3) Files were identified the by the hash, and double counted ones were deleted. 
        (4) The number of downloads as (referenced quantity)/(file size) was 
calculated.   
 
                                                   
2  Referenced quantity could increase not only by downloading, for example, but also by pure transfer triggered by 
Winny software or accidentally disconnected download.  
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Figure 3 shows the weekly pattern of CD sales and numbers of downloads for some 
CD titles (albums only). The horizontal line is the number of weeks passed after the CD 
release. The dotted line is CD sales, and the solid line is the number of downloads. 
Although CD sales decreased as time passed, the number of downloads tended to 
increase. But this negative correlation is possibly spurious because CD sales decrease 
with or without downloads, and it takes some time for a user to upload a music file in 
the Winny user network. We need to control this natural non-stationary tendency to 
correctly estimate the effect of file sharing, but this control is not easy because most CD 




To avoid this difficulty, we used total sales in this study. Figure 4 shows the ratio of 
(total download)/(total sales) for each CD album title. We collected 261 titles. As easily 
seen, there is a large difference among titles. In the case of most downloaded titles, the 
number of downloads reached 35% of sales. On the other hand, we can see no 
downloads for 65 titles. Because the difference is large, if file sharing reduces CD sales 





  3. Effect of download to sales   
 
  Figure 5 shows the XY plot of sales and downloads. There is a positive correlation 
between sales and downloads. But we cannot say that downloads increase CD sales, 
because the causality is two-way: When CD sales increase because of popularity or 
quality of music, then downloads also increase. CD sales and number of downloads is 
simultaneously determined, thus an instrumental variable should be introduced. 
 
        Figure5 
 
          Note that there are 65 titles that were not downloaded. To cope with this 
heterogeneity, we carried the estimation for the two cases: only downloaded titles and 
all titles.   
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  (1) Primary variables (endogenous variables)   
Ln (sale): Natural logarithm of the sale of CDs. CD titles were collected from weekly, 
30 best sellers from June 2004 to November 2004.
3    Thus our sample covers CD titles 
that have reached the best 30 sales at least once. Sample size is 261 for albums and 289 
for single CDs. In this paper we show the estimation result for album case. Since sales 
data are cumulative sales just before the titles disappear from the best 30 lists, there is 
small negative bias to long-selling songs.   
 
Ln(down): Natural logarithm of the number of downloads of CDs. Since the search 
corresponds to the top 30 sales in CD titles each week, there is also small negative bias 
for long-time downloaded songs. We can see no downloads for 65 of 261 titles.   
 
  (2) Explanatory variables (exogenous variables) for CD sales 
Ln(psale): Natural logarithm of the artists’ previous CD sales. It is well known that 
music listeners tend to continue buying the same artists’ CDs. Thus an artist’s previous 
CD sales are a good predictor of current sales. The expected sign is positive. 
Unfortunately, previous CD sales are available for    only 149 of all CD titles. Thus we 
introduce the dummy variable Npresale, which describes a case in which previous CD 
sales are not available. 
Npresale: dummy equal to 1 if there are no previous sales. 
CCCD: Dummy variable for copy-controlled CDs. If the CD is copy-controlled, 
variable CCCD is one. Whether the CD is copy-controlled or not is determined by CD 
catalog data on the web site. If the CCCD prevents the casual copying of CD discs, 
CCCD will increase CD sales. If users do not like CCCD because of quality loss, CCCD 
may decrease CD sales. Therefore, the expected sign is unknown. 
 
  (2) Explanatory variables (exogenous variables) for number of downloads 
EFK: dummy for Enka (Japanese traditional songs), family songs (such as kids exercise 
records) and Korean TV songs. Listeners of these genres are middle-age and not main 
users of file sharing software. Therefore, CDs of these genres are downloaded less 
frequently. The expected sign is negative.   
 
Anime: dummy for anime and video game songs. File sharing users are intensive 
computer users, and tend to be anime fun or video gamers, so called otaku. If this 
                                                   
3  Data source is Original Confidence which is a major Japanese research company about CD sales  
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connection is large, the expected sign is positive. On the other hand, main users of 
anime or game songs are children. If this connection is dominant, the expected sign is 
negative.   
 
West: dummy for western origin music. We classify the CD title as western origin music 
if the language is not Japanese (or Korean). For example, a CD of Utada Hikaru is 
classified as of western origin when she sings in English. We expect that listeners of 
western origin music tend not to be computer intensive (otaku) users. Thus the expected 
sign is negative.   
  D3: dummy when the title continues on the top ten list for more than three weeks 
and the initial week’s sale is over 50% of total sales within the top 30 listings. Because 
the download is slow-started as shown in figure 1, higher sales concentration during the 
initial week may reduce the harm of downloading. The expected sign is negative. 
 
  Table 1 shows the estimation result. Case 0 is the case of simple ordinary least 
squares, showing that the signs of the coefficients are as expected.   
 
  Table 1 
 
  Case 1-2 is the estimation result using the instrumental variable method to cope with 
simultaneous bias. In case 1 we omit 65 non-downloaded titles and use downloaded 
titles only. Adding to this we omit CD titles without previous sales for case 2. Case 3 
includes all CD titles. 
  Coefficients of ln (down) is always positive and significant. Thus downloads do not 
reduce CD sales. To check the robustness of this result we tried all combinations of 
explanatory variables for case 1. Since there are three combinations of explanatory 
variables for ln(sale) regression and 15 combinations for ln(down) regression, we have 
45 combinations of explanatory variables. Figure 6 is the distribution of estimated 
coefficients of ln(down) and its t-values. T-values never reach the negatively significant 




This regression lacks some natural explanatory variables such as a price or 
advertising. But I suppose it is not likely that the coefficient of ln(down) changes 
inversely; that is, becomes significantly negative even if we include other explanatory  
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variables, because there are large differences in download/sale ratio as shown in figure 4, 
and the instrument variables in the ln(down) regression seem to work well.   
 
 
  4    Students survey on copied CDs 
 
We conducted a student survey about illegal copying activity and CD sales. Students 
were asked to profile their history of music CD purchases and file sharing and copied 
CD activity from the first grade of high school to the current university grade. Students 
have 5 to 8 school years, so data is unbalanced panel data. Time t is measured by school 
years; that is, H1, H2, H3 (for high school grades 1, 2 and 3), and U1, U2, U3 (for 
university grades 1, 2 and 3). Sample size was 501, and the number of total observations 
was 2,165. Recall that students were asked to remember their CD purchase history and 
file sharing and copied CD activity. Thus the reliability of this data depends on the 
accuracy of students’ memories. Sample students were chosen from an undergraduate 
course at Keio University in 2003 and 2004.   
 
(1) Explained variable 
CDpurchaseit : number of music CDs that survey participant purchased per year at 
school year t.   
 
(2) Primary explanatory variable 
PtoPit: dummy variable equal to one after survey participant started using PtoP software. 
If file sharing reduces CD purchases as the recoding industry insists, the sign of this 
variable would be negative. 
 
    (3) Other explanatory variables: control variables 
CopyCDit: dummy variable equal to one after survey participant started using copied 
CDs. If use of copied CDs reduces CD purchases, the sign would be negative. 
 
Mphoneit: mobile phone expenditure per month. Unit is 1000 yen. Expenditure on 
mobile phones has increased rapidly during the past five years, along with the decline in 
CD sales. The expected sign is negative. 
 
CDRit: dummy variable equal to one after survey participant bought a CDR drive. Since 
a CDR drive is used to make copied CDs, the sign of this variable could be negative if  
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copied CDs reduces CD purchases. 
 
U3it: dummy variable equal to one when time t is the third grade of university. Share of 
data of third grade university students is only a few percent, but their CD purchase 
activity is unexpectedly low. This is caused by sampling bias. This dummy variable is 
introduced to cope with this outlier effect. Omitting this variable does not change the 
major conclusion of this paper, it only reduces the fitting (R square) slightly. 
   
The panel regression result is shown in table 2. Cases (1) (2) and (3) are the fixed 
effect model, and case (4) is the random effect model. Coefficient of PtoP is 1.747 in the 
fixed effect model and 2.065 in the random effect model, and significant at 10% and 5% 
respectively. To check the robustness of this result we omitted control variables, COPY 
CDR and U3 respectively and found that the result is the same.   
This result indicates that use of file sharing software increases CD purchases. This 
may be surprising, but we have several explanations for this result. First, this positive 
correlation is caused by students’ changing demand for music. If a student suddenly 
gets interested in music, he or she starts to buy more CDs, but at the same time he or she 
may start using file sharing to listen to much music at no charge. In this case, the 
positive correlation between purchase and the use of file sharing is spurious and there 
still can be negative correlation between file sharing and CD purchases if we control 
this simultaneous bias. Second, users can use file sharing as a search tool to find 
favorite music. This is a kind of effect network discussed by Takeyama (1994). If this 
effect is large, illegal file sharing could raise CD purchases. In this case, file sharing 
truly has a positive effect on CD purchases. 
 
 
5. Conclusion   
 
  This research is very preliminary because we have not yet tried sufficient 
instrumental variables. Therefore, we cannot commit to a decisive conclusion. However, 
it is worth reporting that we did not find any negative effect of file sharing on CD sales. 
Specifically, according to micro download data, downloads do not reduce CD sales and 
student surveys show that use of file sharing does not reduce CD purchases.         
  Let us assume that we accept this result and go back to Figure 1. What is the policy 
implication?    Let the change from x 1 to x 2 in figure 1 be an introduction of file sharing 
software. Then as far as this change in concerned, g(revenu(x)) does not decrease. Since  
9 
users’ benefit f(x) surely increases by the use of file sharing software, total benefit 
f(x)+g(revenue(x)) increases by file sharing software. Therefore, bans on file sharing 
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Ordinary least square Instrumental variable
downloaded titles only downloaded titles only
ln(sale) ln(down) ln(sale) ln(down)
Const 5.394 -3.070 5.278 -5.369
(8.82) -(4.32) (8.14) -(3.03)
ln(down) 0.539 *** 0.714 ***
(12.38) (4.20)
ln(sale) 0.923 *** 1.136 ***
(14.26) (6.99)
Ln(PSALE) 0.170 ** 0.070
(2.77) (0.62)












R2 0.571 0.575 0.562 0.574
adjusted R2 0.561 0.564 0.552 0.561
n 177 196 177 177
estimationperiods 2004:6-2004:11, t-values in the parenthsis、 
11 
 







Instrumental variable Instrumental variable
titles downloaded and with all titles
previous sale
ln(sale) ln(down) ln(sale) ln(down)
Const 5.325 -4.933 6.676 -10.708
(9.58) -(3.15) (7.46) -(3.13)
log(down) 0.661 *** 0.465 ***
(3.57) (3.20)
















R2 0.674 0.682 0.370 0.354
adjusted R2 0.664 0.669 0.359 0.340
n 106 106 236 236
estimationperiods 2004:6-2004:11, t-values in the parenthsis、 
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pooled between within random
C 7.158 *** 6.431 *** 7.995 ***
(13.01) (4.89) (11.38)
MP 0.104 0.177 0.036 0.042
(1.22) (0.87) (0.44) (0.56)
COPY 0.683 1.733 -0.188 0.069
(0.80) (0.88) -(0.23) (0.07)
RW 0.434 1.256 0.199 0.222
(0.50) (0.59) (0.25) (0.30)
NY 3.300 ** 4.261 1.747 * 2.065 **
(3.03) (1.63) (1.76) (2.24)
UNIV3 -4.221 * -13.514 -1.894 -2.248
-(1.83) -(1.07) -(1.26) -(1.51)
R2 0.0096 0.0166 0.7288 0.0092
adjustedR2 0.0073 0.0067 0.6463 0.0069
n 501 501 501 501
# of obs 2156 2156 2156 2156





























       
 
   
Users’ benefit. 
(Users include next 
stage innovators) 
f(x)  g(revenue(x)) 
f(x)  g(revenue(x)) 
       Total benefit 
fx) + (revenue(x)) 
weak                  Protection of IPR                    strong 
Incentive for development 
x2 ￿ x1  
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(e.g.    5,719,857) 
Referred Quantity (Mbyte) 
(e.g. 1,447) 
Example 
1447/5.719857 = 252.978 times referred  
15 
 
Figure 3    CD sales and number of downloads in every week after CD release 
         
 
 


































































































































































































































































zero-downloaded for 65 titles 
1
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
6
 
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
t
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
o
r
 
a
l
l
 
c
o
m
b
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
o
r
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
-
v
a
l
u
e
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
～-1
-1～-0.5
-0.5～0.0
0.0～0.5
0.5～1.0
1.0～1.5
1.5～2.0
2.0～2.5
2.5～3.0
3.0～3.5
3.5～4.0
4.0～4.5
4.5～5.0
5.0～5.5
5.5～6.0
t
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
frequency
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
e
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
o
g
(
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
)
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
～-1
-1～-0.6
-0.6～-0.2
-0.2～0.2
0.2～0.6
0.6～1.0
1.0～1.4
1.4～1.8
1.8～2.2
2.2～2.6
2.6～3.0
3.0～3.4
3.4～3.8
3.8～4.2
4.2～4.6
c
o
e
f
f
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
o
g
 
(
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
)
frequency